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When people cannot commit to pay back their loans and there is limited information about
their characteristics, lending institutions must draw inferences about their likelihood of de-
fault. In this paper, we examine how this inference problem impacts consumption smoothing.
In particular, we study an environment populated by two types of people who diﬀer with
respect to their rates of time preference and receive idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Impatient
types are more likely to borrow and default than patient types. Lenders cannot directly
observe a person’s type but make probabilistic assessments of it based on the person’s credit
history. The model delivers an integrated theory of terms of credit and credit scoring that
seems broadly consistent with the data. We also examine the impact of legal restrictions
on the length of time adverse events can remain on one’s credit record for consumption
smoothing and welfare.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The legal environment surrounding the U.S. unsecured consumer credit market is character-
ized by the following features. Broadly speaking, the U.S. Constitution gives private individ-
uals an inalienable right to declare bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. A Chapter
7 bankruptcy permanently discharges net debt (liabilities minus assets above statewide ex-
emption levels). A Chapter 7 ﬁler is ineligible for a subsequent Chapter 7 discharge for 6
years. During that period, the individual is forced into Chapter 13 which is typically a 3-5
year repayment schedule followed by discharge. Over two-thirds of household bankruptcies
in the U.S. are Chapter 7. Finally, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires credit bureaus
to exclude the ﬁling from credit reports after 10 years (and all other adverse items after 7
years).
This lack of commitment does not prevent private unsecured borrowing. Currently, the
level of unsecured consumer credit in the U.S. is between 10 to 15 percent of annual aggre-
gate consumption and there is 1 bankruptcy ﬁling per year for every 75 U.S. households.
Evidently, the current market arrangement works. The question is how does it work and
could it work better without legal restrictions?
Given the inability of people to commit, it’s important for a lender to assess the proba-
bility that a borrower will fail to pay back — that is, assess the risk of default. In the U.S.,
lenders use credit scores as an index of the risk of default. The credit scores most commonly
used are produced by a single company, the Fair Isaac and Company, and are known as
FICO scores.1 These scores range between 300 and 850, where a higher score signals a lower
probability of default. The national distribution of FICO scores are given in Figure 1.
1Over 75% of mortgage lenders and 80% of the largest ﬁnancial institutions use FICO scores in their
evaluation and approvals process for credit applications.
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Source: http://www.myﬁco.com/myﬁco/Credit Central/ScoringWorks.asp
A FICO score aggregates information from an individual’s credit record like his payment
history (most particularly the presence of adverse public records such as bankruptcy and
delinquency) and current amounts owed.2 These scores appear to aﬀect the extension of
consumer credit in four primary ways.
1. Credit terms appear to improve with a person’s credit score.
2. The presence of a bankruptcy ﬂag constrains individual’s access to credit.
3. The removal of adverse public records can raise scores substantially and boosts access
to credit.
4. Taking on more debt (paying oﬀ debt) tends to lower (raise) credit scores.
2The score also takes into account the length of a person’s credit history, the kinds of credit accounts
(retail credit, installment credit etc.) and the borrowing capacity (or line of credit) on each account. It’s
also worth noting the kinds of information that are not used in credit scores. By law, credit scores cannot
use information on race, color, national origin, sex, and marital status. Further, FICO scores do not use
age, assets, salary, occupation, and employment history.
2Table 1
FICO Score Auto Loan Mortgage
720-850 4.94% 5.55%
700-719 5.67% 5.68%
675-699 7.91% 6.21%
620-674 10.84% 7.36%
560-619 15.14% 8.53%
500-559 18.60% 9.29%
Source: http://www.myﬁco.com/myﬁco/Credit Central/LoanRates.asp
Table 1 provides information on the relationship between FICO scores and the average
interest rate on a new 60-month auto loan or a new 30-year ﬁxed mortgage consistent with
item 1. Item 2 is consistent with evidence in Fisher, Filer, and Lyons [5]. Using data from
the PSID and SCF, they document that a higher percentage of post-bankruptcy households
were denied access to credit. Item 3 is consistent with evidence provided in Musto [9]. Musto
studied the impact of striking an individual’s bankruptcy record from his or her credit history
after 10 years (as required by the Fair Credit and Reporting Act). He found (p.735) “there
is a strong tenth year eﬀect for the best initial credits...these consumers move ahead of
19% of the nonﬁler population in apparent creditworthiness when their ﬂags are removed.”
Furthermore, he states (p.740) “...the boost translates to signiﬁcant new credit access for
these ﬁlers over the ensuing year”. In conjunctionw i t hT a b l e1 ,i t e m s2a n d3s u g g e s tt h a t
an individual who fails to pay back an unsecured loan will experience an adverse change in
the terms of (unsecured) credit. Thus, a failure to pay back a loan adversely impacts the
terms of credit and may result in outright denial of credit. Item 4 is consistent with the
advice given by FICO for improving one’s credit score.3 Additionally, item 4 in conjunction
with Table 1 indicates that even absent default, the terms of credit on unsecured credit
worsen as an individual gets further into debt — people face a rising marginal cost of funds.
These facts suggest the following characterization of the workings of the unsecured con-
3To improve a score, FICO advises to “Keep balances low on credit card and ‘other revolving credit”’
and “[p]ay oﬀ debt rather than moving it around”. Source:www.myﬁco.com/CreditEducation/ImproveYour
Score
3sumer credit market. Given the inability of borrowers to commit to pay back, lenders
condition the terms of credit (including whether they lend at all) on an individual’s credit
history. This history is somehow encapsulated by a credit score. Individuals with higher
scores are viewed by lenders as less likely to default and receive credit on more attractive
terms. The failure to pay back a loan (default) leads to a drop in the individual’s credit
score. Consequently, post-default access to credit is available on worse terms and may not be
available at all. Even absent default, greater indebtedness leads to a lower credit score and
worse terms of credit. Finally, there is considerable amount of unsecured credit extended
under these circumstances and a non-trivial fraction of borrowers default.
There is now a fairly substantial literature on how (and to what extent) borrowing can
occur when agents cannot commit to pay back (some key papers will be noted below). The
challenge, as we see it, is to use the insights of this literature to specify a structure that can
make quantitative sense of the characterization of the unsecured consumer credit market
oﬀered in the previous paragraph.
This paper takes some tentative steps toward meeting this challenge. We consider an
environment with a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived people who at any point in time may be
one of two types who diﬀer in their discount factor. An agent’s type is drawn independently
from others and follows a two-state Markov process which is identical for everyone. Types
diﬀer in their discount factors. Importantly, a person’s type is private information.
These people interact with a competitive ﬁnancial intermediation sector that can borrow
in the international credit market at some ﬁxed risk-free rate and make one-period loans to
i n d i v i d u a l sa ta ni n t e r e s tr a t et h a tr e ﬂects that person’s risk of default. Because diﬀerences in
preference bear on the willingness of each type of person to pay back a loan, intermediaries
must form some assessment of a person’s type. We model this as a Bayesian inference
problem: intermediaries use the recorded history of a person’s actions in the credit market
to update their prior probability of the person being of a given type and then charge an
interest rate that is appropriate for the posterior probability.
We model the pricing of unsecured consumer loans in the same fashion as in our pre-
decessor paper Chatterjee, et.al. [2]. As in that paper, all one-period loans are viewed as
4discount bonds and the price of these bonds depend on the size of the bond. This is necessary
because the probability of default (for any type) will depend on the size of the bond (i.e.,
on the person’s liability). In addition, and this is a feature that is new to this paper, the
price of the bond also depends on the posterior probability of a person being of a given type,
conditional on selling that particular sized bond. This is necessary because the two types
will not have the same probability of default for any given sized bond and a person’s asset
choice is potentially informative about the person’s type. With this asset market structure,
competition implies that the expected rate of return on each type of bond is equal to the
(exogenous) risk-free rate.
This is, possibly, the simplest environment one could imagine that could make sense of
the observed connection between credit history and the terms of credit. Suppose it turns
out that, in equilibrium, one type of person, say type g, always has a lower probability
of default. Then, under competition, the price of a discount bond (of any size) could be
expected to be positively related to the probability of a person being of type g. Further,
default will lower the posterior probability of being of type g because type g people default
less frequently. If we interpret a person’s credit score as (some positive transform of) the
probability of a person being of type g, we would explain Table 1 and item 1. We caution
the reader, however, that although this sounds intuitive the statement that a person of type
g is always less likely to default is a very strong restriction on equilibrium behavior and may
require correspondingly strong assumptions on fundamentals.
There are two strands of existing literature to which our paper is closely related. One
strand relates to the banking literature where Diamond’s [4] well-known paper on acqui-
sition of reputation in debt markets is a key reference.4 Diamond considers a situation
w h e r et h e r ea r et w ot y p e so fi n ﬁnitely-lived risk-neutral entrepreneurs who interact with a
competitive ﬁnancial intermediation sector. Financial intermediaries make one-period loans
without directly observing the entrepreneur’s type. One type of entrepreneur always chooses
the safe project but the other type chooses between a safe project and risky project and
an entrepreneur defaults if the project fails. Since an entrepreneur’s loss is bounded be-
4Phelan [10] studies reputation aquisition by a government in a related framework.
5low, the second type has an incentive to choose the risky project. In this environment, an
entrepreneur’s payment history (did the project ever fail?) reveals something about an en-
trepreneur’s type. Consequently, the terms of credit oﬀered to an entrepreneur will depend
on the entrepreneur’s payment history. Diamond’s set-up clearly has parallels to our own.
The main diﬀerence is that for us the decision to default is the key decision (in Diamond
this happens only when the project fails) and we don’t permit any choice with regard to the
riskiness of the income stream.
The second strand of literature to which our paper is related is the literature on sovereign
debt. This literature shares with us the concern about the inability of the borrower to commit
to pay back. The inability of the sovereign to commit stems from the fact that the sovereign
does not (by deﬁnition) answer to a higher authority. In this strand, the paper that is most
closely related to ours is Cole, Dow and English [3]. They focus on an interesting aspect of
sovereign defaults, namely, that a sovereign who defaults is shut out of international credit
market until such time as the sovereign makes a payment on the defaulted debt. In our
case, the inability to commit stems from a right to bankruptcy granted to an individual by
the legal system. Consequently, a bankruptcy results in a discharge of existing debt and
individuals do not have the option of making payment on discharged debt in the future.5
Our framework has the ability to address an interesting question that arises from Musto’s
empirical work. What are the eﬀects on consumption smoothing and welfare of imposing legal
restrictions (like the Fair Credit Reporting Act), which requires adverse credit information
(like a bankruptcy) to be stricken from one’s record after a certain number of years (10
in the U.S.)? Speciﬁcally, Musto p. 726 states that his empirical “results bear on the
informational eﬃciency of the consumer credit market, the eﬃcacy of regulating this market
with reporting limits, and the quality of postbankruptcy credit access, which in turn bears
on the incentive to ﬁle in the ﬁrst place.” He ﬁnds p. 747 “the removal of the ﬂag leads
to excessive credit, increasing the eventual probability of default. This is concrete evidence
that the ﬂag regulation has real economic eﬀects. This is market eﬃciency in reverse.” We
5Given the choice between Chapter 7 and 13, individuals would choose to ﬁle Chapter 13 only if they
wished to keep assets they would lose under a Chapter 7 ﬁling. Since borrowers in our model have negative
net worth (there is only one asset), Chapter 7 is always the preferred means to ﬁle for bankruptcy.
6use our model to assess this eﬃciency concern. In a world of incomplete markets and private
information, ﬂag removal may provide insurance to impatient agents in our framework that
competitive intermediaries may not be able to provide. Hence extending the length of time
that bankruptcy ﬂags remain on credit records may not necessarily raise ex-ante welfare.
This issue echoes Hart’s [8] examples where the opening of a market in a world of incomplete
markets may make agents worse oﬀ.
2 Model Economy
We begin by describing the market arrangement in our model economy. This is followed
by a recursive formulation of the individual’s decision problem and a description of proﬁt
maximizing behavior of ﬁrms serving the unsecured credit industry.
2.1 Default Option and Market Arrangement
We model the default option to resemble, in procedure, a Chapter 7 bankruptcy ﬁling. If an
individual ﬁles for bankruptcy, the individual’s beginning of period liabilities are set to zero
(i.e., the individual’s debt is discharged) but during the ﬁling period (when the individual’s
books are open) he is not permitted to enter new contracts.6
There is a competitive credit industry that accepts deposits and makes loans to individ-
uals. An individual can borrow at an interest ra t et h a td e p e n d so nt h es i z eo ft h el o a na n d
on the market’s belief about the individual’s type. We will assume that there are only two
types of people denoted type g and b. As noted earlier, belief about an individual’s type is
important because an individual cannot commit to repay and the probability of repayment
can vary across types. An individual can also save via deposits and all deposits fetch a
constant risk-free rate.
Time is discrete and indexed by t. Let  t ∈ L ⊂ R be an agent’s beginning of period
t asset holding (chosen in period t − 1), where  t < 0d e n o t e sd e b ta n d t ≥ 0 denotes
6Unlike Chatterjee, et. al. [2], the agent is not bound from borrowing until the bankruptcy ﬁling leaves
his record.
7deposits. The set L is ﬁnite. Let dt be an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1
if the individual defaults in period t on loan  t and zero otherwise (in the event of default
at t,  t+1 is constrained to be 0). An individual’s history of observed actions (asset choices
and default decisions) at the beginning of period t is given by ( t,h t(T)) where ht(T)=
(dt−1,  t−1,d t−2,..., t+1−T,d t−T)w h e r eT ≥ 1.7 We assume an asset market structure where
in period t the price of a loan of size  t +1∈ L made to an individual with history ( t,h t)
is given by q( t +1 ,  t,h t) ≥ 0.8
2.2 People
T h e r ei sau n i tm e a s u r eo fp e o p l e .A ta n yt i m et, people can be one of two types, indexed
by it ∈ {g,b}.
Within a period, the timing of events is as follows. At the start of a period, each person
learns his type and this type is drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from a two-state Markov process
with transition matrix δ(i0|i)=P r ( it+1 = i0|it = i). In particular, if an agent was of type i in
period t, he will remain type i in the current period with probability 1−δi and change type
with probability δi. Next, each individual receives a random endowment of goods and this
endowment is an i.i.d. draw with measure η on a compact support E ⊂ R++. After observing
his type and endowment, an individual chooses whether to default on his borrowings if  t < 0.
Finally, the individual chooses his asset position  t+1 and consumes ct. While an individual’s
type, endowment, and consumption are private information, his default decisions and asset
position are observable.
Given our asset market structure, it is natural to adopt a recursive formulation of an
individual’s decision problem with state variables given by (i,e, ,h(T)). The value function
of an agent of type i, denoted by vi(e, ,h), solves the following functional equation:
7We do not include prices of these one-period contracts in the history ( t,h t(T)) since they are considered
proprietary and excluded from standard credit reports.
8Since current ﬁlers cannot enter into contracts, it should be understood that these prices are extended
to individuals with dt = 0 allowing us to neglect burdensome notation.
8Case 1: When  <0
vi(e, ,h;q)= m a x
d∈{0,1}
v
d
i(e, ,h;q)( 1 )
where the value function when the agent decides not to default (d =0 )i sg i v e nb y
v
0
i(e, ,h;q)= m a x
(c, 0)∈B(e, ,h;q)6=∅
ui(c)+
βi
Z
E
[(1 − δi)vi(e
0, 
0,h
0)+δiv−i(e
0, 
0,h
0)] η(de
0)( 2 )
where
B(e, ,h;q)={c ≥ 0, 
0 ∈ L | c + q( 
0, ,h) ·  
0 ≤ e +  }
and the value function when the agent chooses to default (d =1 )o rB(e, ,h;q)=∅ (in
which case default is the only option) is given by
v
1
i(e, ,h;q)=ui(e)+βi
Z
E
[(1 − δi)vi(e
0,0,h
0;q)+δiv−i(e
0,0,h
0;q)] η(de
0).
Here, ui(c) is the utility that an individual of type i receives from consuming c units of the
good and βi is his discount factor. The continuation of h =( d−1,  −1,..., +2−T,d +1−T,  +1−T,d −T)
following action ( 0,d)i sg i v e nb y
h
0(T)=λ( ,d,h;T)
=( d, ,..., +2−T,d +1−T).
The value function under default, v1
i(e, ,h), assumes that default d =1w i p e so u ta l ld e b t
and that a defaulting individual cannot accumulate any asset in the period of default (i.e.
 0 =0 ) .
Case 2: When   ≥ 0,
vi(e, ,h;q)=v
0
i(e, ,h;q). (3)
In what follows we denote the set of earnings for which an individual of type i and
history ( ,h) defaults on a loan of size   by Di( ,h;q)={e | di(e, ,h;q)=1 } ⊆ E.W ew i l l
also denote by Ei( 0, ,h;q)={e |  0
i(e, ,h;q)= 0} ⊆ E the set of earnings for which an
individual of type i in history ( ,h)c h o o s e s 0.
92.3 The Credit Industry
Financial intermediaries have access to an international credit market where they can borrow
or lend at the risk-free interest rate r ≥ 0. The proﬁto nal o a no fs i z e 0 < 0m a d et oa n
individual with history ( ,h)i st h ep r e s e n td i s c o u n t e dv a l u eo fi n ﬂows less the current value
of outﬂows and the proﬁt on deposit of size  0 > 0m a d et oa ni n d i v i d u a lw i t hh i s t o r y(  ,h)
is the current value of the inﬂows less the present discounted value of outﬂows. Then the
proﬁt on a contract of type ( 0, ,h), denoted π( 0, ,h;q,p), is:
π( 
0, ,h;q,p)=



(1 + r)−1[1 − p( 0, ,h)](− 0) − q( 0, ,h)(− 0)i f  0 < 0
q( 0, ,h) 0 − (1 + r)−1 0 if  0 ≥ 0
(4)
where p( 0, ,h) is the fraction of individuals with history ( ,h)e x p e c t e dt od e f a u l to nal o a n
of size  0 tomorrow. If α( 0, ,h)i st h em e a s u r eo ft y p e(  0, ,h) contracts sold, the decision
problem of an intermediary is to maximize
P
 0,( ,h) π( 0, ,h;q,p) · α( 0, ,h) subject to the
constraint that α( 0, ,h) ≥ 0.
3 Equilibrium
Let µ be a distribution of individuals over {g,b}×L × H where H is the set of all possible
h. An equilibrium is a set of decision rules, a price menu, default probabilities, beliefs, and a
distribution (that is, (( 0
i( ,h;q∗),d i( ,h;q∗)),q∗,p ∗,Ψ∗,µ ∗)w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes the following ﬁve
sets of conditions.
The ﬁrst set are the optimization conditions of individuals. That is, given q∗,(  0
i( ,h;q∗),d i( ,h;q∗))
must be consistent with (1) and (3).
The second set are zero proﬁt conditions for loans and deposits
q
∗( 
0, ,h;p
∗)=



(1 + r)−1[1 − p∗( 0, ,h;Ψ∗)]  0 < 0
(1 + r)−1  0 ≥ 0
. (5)
The third set of conditions involve the default probabilities which must be consistent
10with decision rules and beliefs
p
∗( 
0, ,h;Ψ
∗)=



[1 − η(Dg( 0,h 0;q∗))] · Ψ∗( 0,0, ,h)
+[1 − η(Db( 0,h 0;q∗))] · (1 − Ψ∗( 0,0, ,h))



. (6)
where the belief function Ψ∗( 0,d, ,h) denotes the probability that an individual who chose
( 0,d) in history ( ,h)i so ft y p eg at the beginning of the following period after the realization
o ft h et y p ec h a n g es h o c k .
The fourth and most important set of conditions concern the equilibrium belief (updating)
function Ψ∗( 0,d, ,h). We require that beliefs must be consistent with Bayes’ rule whenever
applicable.9 Recall that according to Bayes’ rule, the probability that event A is true given
that event B is true is given by Pr(A|B)=
Pr(B|A)Pr(A)
Pr(B) provided Pr(B) > 0.10 Translating
to our problem, the ﬁnancial intermediary evaluates the probability that an individual is
type g conditional on observing their credit history ( ,h) and current actions ( 0,d). Thus,
we let event A be deﬁned as “the agent’s type is g” and event B be deﬁned as “observing
9This notion of assigning beliefs “whenever possible” as to individual types on the basis of Bayes Rule is
similar to what is assumed as part of a deﬁnition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Tirole
[6], p. 331-333).
10In Bayesian terminology, Pr(A) is the prior probability that A is true and Pr(A | B)i st h ep o s t e r i o r
probability that A is true given that B is observed.
11( 0,d, ,h)”. Applying Bayes law gives11
Pr(g| 
0,d, ,h)=
Pr( 0,d, ,h|g)Pr(g)
Pr( 0,d, ,h)
(7)
=
Pr( 0,d|g, ,h)Pr(g| ,h)
Pr( 0,d|g, ,h)Pr(g| ,h)+P r (  0,d|b, ,h)Pr(b| ,h)
.
There are two mutually exclusive events associated with possible ( 0,d) choices that are
partitioned on the basis of the default decision. First, a type i individual with history ( ,h)
defaults on loan   so that  0 =0 ,d=1 . In that case Pr(0,1|i, ,h)=η(Di( ,h;q∗)). In the
second case, a type i individual with history ( ,h)d o e sn o td e f a u l to nl o a n  (which is obvi-
ously the case when   ≥ 0) and chooses  0 ∈ L. In this case Pr( 0,0|i, ,h)=η(Ei( 0, ,h;q∗)).
The other terms in (7) are given by
Pr(i| ,h)=
µ∗(i, ,h)
P
j∈{g,b} µ∗(j, ,h)
. (8)
Therefore, prior to the type shock realization, the posterior probability that an individual
in history ( ,h) who defaults on his loan is of type g is given by:
Pr(g|0,1, ,h)=
η(Dg( ,h;q∗))µ∗(g, ,h)
η(Dg( ,h;q∗))µ∗(g, ,h)+η(Db( ,h;q∗))µ∗(b, ,h)
(9)
11This expression follows from: (i)
Pr( 0,d, ,h|g)=P r (  0,d|g, ,h)Pr( ,h|g),
where another application of Bayes’ law to the last expression yields
Pr( ,h|g)=
Pr(g| ,h)Pr( ,h)
Pr(g)
so that the numerator Pr( 0,d, ,h|g)Pr(g) can be written
·
Pr( 0,d|g, ,h)
Pr(g| ,h)Pr( ,h)
Pr(g)
¸
Pr(g);
and (ii) the fact that the denominator Pr( 0,d, ,h)c a nb ew r i t t e n
Pr( 0,d| ,h)P( ,h)
where
Pr( 0,d| ,h)=P r (  0,d|g, ,h)Pr(g| ,h)+P r (  0,d|b, ,h)Pr(b| ,h).
12and the posterior that an individual in history ( ,h) who chooses not to default and to enter
the asset market is of type g is given by
Pr(g| 
0,0, ,h)=
η(Eg( 0, ,h;q∗))µ∗(g, ,h)
η(Eg( 0, ,h;q∗))µ∗(g, ,h)+η(Eb( 0 ,h;q∗))µ∗(b, ,h)
(10)
Then, given that type can change at the beginning of the next period,
Ψ
∗( 
0,d, ,h)=( 1− δg)Pr(g| 
0,d, ,h)+δb [1 − Pr(g| 
0,d, ,h)]. (11)
Since Bayes’ rule is applicable only if the conditioning event has positive probability, we may
also need to assign values to Ψ( 0,d, ,h) in some fashion when the conditioning set is empty.
Theory does not restrict the assignment but there may be existence and computational issues
involved in the choice.
The ﬁfth condition requires that for a steady state equilibrium µ∗ is a ﬁxed point of the
mapping
µ
0(i
0, 
0,h
0)=
"
X
i, ,h
Z
e
δ(i
0|i)1{ 
0
i(e, ,h;q
∗)= 
0,λ( ,di(e, ,h;q
∗),h;T)=h
0}dη(e)µ(i, ,h)
#
.
(12)
With a ﬁnite number of histories (i.e. when T<∞), the computation of an equilibrium
is straightforward and a mapping to type scores, Pr(g| ,h), follows using (8). For the T = ∞
case, computation of an equilibrium requires that we encode the inﬁnite history in a man-
ageable way. This can be done provided we make an assumption about the updating formula
(11). To state the assumption, consider any two distinct histories ( ,h)a n d(  ,b h)w i t ht h e
property that Pr(g| ,h)=P r ( g| ,b h). Then, we assume that Ψ( 0,d, ,h)=Ψ( 0,d, ,b h)f o r
all  0,d.In other words, if two individuals with the same beginning-of-period asset positions
have exactly the same prior probability of being of type g,t h eposterior probability of their
being of type g is the same if they take the same actions. That is, the updated proba-
bility depends not on how they arrived at   provided Pr(g| ,h)=P r ( g| ,b h). Under this
assumption, we can replace the inﬁnite-dimensional state variable h by the scalar s, where
s is the prior (or, equivalently, the beginning-of-period) probability of being of type g (i.e.
s =P r ( g| ,h(∞)). The law of motion of this new state variable s is given by s0 = Ψ( 0,d, ,s)
in equation (11). Intuitively, if the updating rule does not distinguish between these two
13people then there is no reason for these two people to behave diﬀerently conditional on type.
Hence the prior probability s and beginning-of-period asset position   are the only two state
variables needed in the household decision problem.
4 When is a Type Score a Credit Score?
We start with the case where the entire histo r yo fa s s e tm a r k e ta c t i o n sa r ek e p ti nt h e
individual’s record (i.e. T = ∞ so that no information is discarded). We will set aside the
question of whether an equilibrium exists and simply provide an example of an equilibrium
below. We are simply interested in knowing whether a type score has the four properties of
a credit score noted in the introduction. For instance, under what conditions on ui(.)a n d
βi is Dg( ,s;q∗) ⊆ Db( ,s;q∗) for any s and  ? Such a ranking would give content to the
statement that, from the perspective of lenders, type g is the good type and type b is the
bad type and, therefore, give some basis for identifying the type score ( the probability that
ap e r s o ni so ft y p eg)w i t hacredit score. However, the potentially complex dependence of
a person’s decision rule on the q and Ψ functions makes it challenging to provide such a
ranking — unless very strong assumptions are made on preferences and choice sets.
To make progress, we will specialize the model to a case that is simple enough so that with
a combination of reasoning and numerical simulation we can develop some intuition on the
basic economics of the situation. With this mind, we will make the following assumptions:
A1. βb =0a n d0<β g.
A2. δi ∈ (0,1) and 1 − δg >δ b.
A3. L = {−x,0,x}.
A4. If η(Di( ,s;q)) = 0 for all i, Ψ(0,1, ,s)=( 1 −δg)s+δb(1−s)a n di fη(Ei( 0, ,s;q)) = 0
for all i, Ψ( 0,0, ,s)=( 1− δg)s + δb(1 − s).
The strong assumption is that type b agents are myopic. This strong assumption will
enable us to characterize their decision rule independent of their type score s. The second as-
sumption on type transition probabilities will yield a nondegenerate interval for type scores.
14The third assumption, while making asset choices simple to characterize, limits how much
separation can go on. The fourth assumption concerns oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs; if no
o n ew i t ht y p es c o r es takes a certain action, then we update using their current score.
Assumption A1 provides a very simple characterization of type b behavior.
Proposition 1.F o r a n y s, type b agents borrow if   ∈ {0,x} and default if   = −x
and prices are strictly positive. Speciﬁcally: (i) Eb(x, ,s;q∗)=∅;( i i )Dg(−x,s;q) ⊆
Db(−x,s;q)=E; and (iii) for   ∈ {0,x}, Eg(−x, ,s;q∗) ⊆ Eb(−x, ,s;q∗) ∈ {∅,E}.
These results follow because a type b person cares about an action only to the extent it aﬀects
current consumption — what any action might entail about the person’s future type-score
is not relevant because the person does not care about the future at all. This is true even
though the type b agent may switch to being type g at the start of the next period simply
because switches happen in the future and a type b person does not give any weight to the
future. Therefore, if choosing  0 = x is feasible it is strictly dominated by choosing  0 =0( —
the latter is a feasible choice if the former is feasible) and part (i) follows. To see part (ii),
observe that paying the debt back and not borrowing (i.e., choosing (d, 0)=( 0 ,0)) results in
a reduction of current consumption and is strictly dominated by choosing (d, 0)=( 1 ,0) for
at y p eb. Paying the debt back and borrowing also results in a drop in current consumption
since current consumption under this action is −(1−q∗(−x,Ψ∗(−x,0,−x,s)) < 0 by virtue
o ft h ef a c tt h a ti ne q u i l i b r i u mt h eq∗(−x,σ) ≤ 1/(1+r) < 1 for any σ.12 Therefore, for a type
b person with debt, the optimal decision is to default independent of his earnings. To see part
(iii), consider the following two cases. First, if q(−x,Ψ∗(−x,0, ,s)) > 0, the optimal decision
for a type b agent is to borrow since this maximizes current period consumption and that’s all
the person cares about. Therefore, Eb(−x, ,s;q∗)=E. Second, if q(−x,Ψ∗(−x,0, ,s)) =
0, then agents are borrowing constrained and neither type can choose  0
i = −x. Hence
Eg(−x, ,s;q∗)=Eb(−x, ,s;q∗)=∅.
Given that type b people behave in this way, we can now partially characterize the equi-
12In order to economize on notation, rather than expressing q as a function of  0, ,and s, we express q as
a function of the updated score s0 = Ψ( 0,d, ,s). We can do this, because the only reason that  ,s matters
for prices is for the inference about an individual’s type at the time of repayment.
15librium updating function Ψ∗.W eh a v e :
Proposition 2. If an individual does not choose −x, his updated score will generally
rise. Speciﬁcally: (i) if   ∈ {0,x} and η(Eg(x, ,s;q∗)) > 0, Bayesian updating implies
Ψ∗ (x,0, ,s)=1− δg; and (ii) If   ∈ {0,x},η (Eg(0, ,s;q∗)) > 0, and Eb(−x, ,s;q∗)=E,
Bayesian updating implies Ψ∗ (0,0, ,s)=1− δg.
For (i), if the person saves, then by Proposition 1(i), he is not of type b. Provided in equilib-
rium there is some e for which type g agent with  ,s chooses to save (i.e. η(Eg(x, ,s;q∗)) > 0,
a requirement that is necessary to apply Bayes’ formula), then by (10) Pr(g| 0,0, ,s)=1 .13
The Proposition follows from (11). For (ii), we know by Proposition 1(iii) that in equilib-
rium Eb(−x, ,s;q∗) ∈ {∅,E}. If all type b borrow, then lenders can correctly infer, provided
η(Eg(0, ,s;q∗)) > 0, that an agent who chooses  0 =0i so ft y p eg.
The next two propositions address issues that are at the heart of this project. These
propositions establish that in equilibrium the type score s has properties that resemble the
properties of credit scores, namely, that credit scores decline with default and decline (im-
prove) with increasing (decreasing) indebtedness (consistent with item 4).
Proposition 3. A default lowers an agent’s pre-type-shock score. Speciﬁcally, Bayesian
updating implies Pr(g|0,1,−x,s) ≤ s.
To see why the proposition is true, observe ﬁrst that given the assumptions on δi and
the deﬁnition in (11), it follows that Ψ∗( 0,d, ,s) ∈ [δb,1 − δg] so we need only consider
s ∈ (0,1). Next, by Proposition 1(ii), η(Db(−x,s;q∗)) = 1. Therefore, by (9) we have:
Pr(g|0,1,−x,s) − s =
(1 − s)[η(Dg( ,s;q∗)) · s − s]
[η(Dg( ,s;q∗))] · s +( 1− s)
.
If η(Dg( ,s;q∗)) < 1, then Pr(g|0,1,−x,s) − s<0; that is, if some type g persons do not
default, default increases the probability that a person is of type b. If η(Dg( ,s;q∗)) = 1,
default does not provide any information about type and Pr(g|0,1,−x,s)=s.
Proposition 4. Running down assets lowers an agent’s pre-type-shock score and running
them up raises that score. Speciﬁcally, suppose Eb(−x, ,s;q∗)=E.( i ) I f   ∈ {0,x},
13If this requirement is not met, then Pr(g| 0,0, ,s)=0
0.
16Bayesian updating implies Pr(g|−x,0, ,s) ≤ s. (ii) If  0 ∈ {0,x} and η(Eg( 0,−x,s;q∗)) > 0,
Bayesian updating implies Pr(g| 0,0,−x,s)=1 .
Part (i) of the proof is analogous to that of Proposition 3. Intuitively, if type b people can
borrow and some type g do not borrow then taking on debt strictly increases the likelihood
that the person is of type b (otherwise the score does not change). Since there is only a single
level of debt in this model, this property is the model analog of taking on debt in item 4
mentioned in the introduction. Again, since all type b are borrowing, part (ii) follows since
paying down debt signals the agent is of type g.
It is worth pointing out that Proposition 4 does not hold for people who have debt and
choose to continue to be in debt. The next result follows from Proposition 1(ii) and (10).
Proposition 5. Maintaining debt helps raise an agent’s pre-type-shock score. Speciﬁ-
cally, if η(Eg(−x,−x,s;q∗)) > 0, Bayesian updating implies Pr(g| − x,0,−x,s)=1 .
It is important to recognize that Propositions 4 and 5 refer to the function Pr(g| 0,d, ,s).The
impact of a person’s action on s0 will depend not only on how Pr(g| 0,d, ,s)i sa ﬀected, but
also on the possibility that the person may change type by the following period. This induces
“mean-reversion” in the Ψ function.14 This is consistent with Musto’s ﬁnding that (p.735)
“FICO scores are mean-reverting.”
Pr(g| 
0,d, ,s) <
δb
δg + δb
=⇒ Ψ( 
0,d, ,s) > Pr(g| 
0,d, ,s)
and Pr(g| 
0,d, ,s) >
δb
δg + δb
=⇒ Ψ( 
0,d, ,s) < Pr(g| 
0,d, ,s).
This feature makes it important to distinguish between Pr(g| 0,d, ,s)a n dΨ( 0,d, ,s)i n
discussing the impact of current actions on a person’s type score. In particular, if the person’s
14To see this, let ϕ =P r ( g| 0,d, ,s) and simply manipulate (11):
Ψ =( 1− δg)ϕ + δb [1 − ϕ]
⇐⇒ Ψ − ϕ = −(δg + δb)ϕ + δb.
Hence
Ψ − ϕ>0 ⇐⇒
δb
(δg + δb)
>ϕ .
17current period score is low it is possible for his next period score to rise after default. For
example, consider a person with s = δb. If this person defaults his Pr(g|0,1, ,δ b) will be
less than δb but positive (provided η(Dg( ,δb;q∗)) > 0). Since Pr(g| 0,d, ,s) is positive, it
follows from the deﬁnition of the Ψ function that Ψ∗(0,1,−x,δb) >δ b = s!B a s i c a l l y ,w h e n
a person’s score is low the mean reverting force can end up being the dominant one and can
raise a person’s score in the period following default.
Propositions 1-5 exhaust what we can say analytically about the nature of the equilib-
rium. Notably, these propositions do not say anything about item 1 in the introduction. By
Proposition 1(ii), the probability of default on a loan made to a person with (updated) score
σ is
p(−x,σ;q
∗)=η(Dg(−x,σ;q
∗)) · σ +( 1− σ).
If η(Dg) < 1 then, holding ﬁxed η(Dg), it is clear that a higher σ is associated with a lower
probability of default. However, η(Dg) is not in general independent of σ. Therefore, unless
we can characterize the behavior of type g people we cannot prove that item 1 is true in this
model. But the behavior of type g people is hard to characterize because unlike type b, their
decisions are aﬀected by (q∗,Ψ∗) which itself is determined by their actions. Thus, we turn
to exploring the behavior of type g people numerically.
At this stage, we have not calibrated the model. Here we simply take βg =0 .75, r =
(0.8/0.75) − 1, δg =0 .1,δ b =0 .5, x =0 .5, and consider a uniform distribution over a 61
element grid of earnings given by {10−10,0.35,0.7,1.05,...,21.0}.
We will start by describing the equilibrium Ψ function. It is useful to start here because
what people reveal about themselves by their actions will be key to understanding how type
g individuals behave. Given our assumptions about δg and δb in A2 it follows from (11)
that Ψ∗ ∈ [0.5,0.9] so that in a stationary equilibrium a person’s beginning of period score
s ∈ [0.5,0.9].
Equilibrium Ψ Function Ψ∗( 0,d, ,s)
•   = −x.
1. Ψ∗(0,1,−x,s) <sfor s>0.69
182. Ψ∗(−x,0,−x,s)=( 1− δg)s + δb(1 − s)
3. Ψ∗(0,0,−x,s)=( 1− δg)s + δb(1 − s)
4. Ψ∗(x,0,−x,s)=1− δg
•   =0 .
1. Ψ∗(−x,0,0,s) <sfor s>0.51
2. Ψ∗(0,0,0,s)=1− δg
3. Ψ∗(x,0,0,s)=1− δg
•   = x.
1. Ψ∗(−x,0,x,s)=δb
2. Ψ∗(0,0,x,s)=1− δg
3. Ψ∗(x,0,x,s)=1− δg
Consider ﬁrst the case where the individual is in debt (  = −x). While we know from
Proposition 1(ii) that type b always default, in this particular equilibrium, for every s some
type g default (those with low earnings) and the remaining type g choose d =0a n d 0 = x
(those with high earnings). In fact, in this equilibrium the default decision of a type g agent
depends only on earnings and is independent of s. Figure 2 plots η(Dg(−x,s;q∗)) = 0.41
for all s ∈ [0.5,0.9]. T h ef a c tt h a tf o re v e r ys some type g c h o o s et op a yb a c kt h e i rl o a n
makes equilibrium loan prices positive, i.e., q∗(−x,σ) > 0f o rσ ∈ [0.5,0.9]. If an individual
defaults then Pr(g|0,1, ,s) <sin accordance with the discussion following Proposition 5
since default strictly reduces the probability of an individual being of type g. Note however
that because of the mean reversion in Ψ the person’s score at the start of next period,
Ψ∗(0,1,−x,s), is lower than s only if s>0.69. See Figure 3 which plots Ψ∗(0,1,−x,s)
against a 45◦ line. Next, if an individual chooses  0 = x his Pr(g| 0,0,−x,s)r i s e st o1
because only type g people take this action. Finally, in this equilibrium a type g person
with debt never chooses  0 ∈ {−x,0} so that η(Eg( 0,−x,s;q∗)) = 0 for  0 ∈ {−x,0}. For
19these actions, oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs are assigned according to the rule speciﬁed in
assumption A4.
Consider next the case where the individual does not have any assets (  =0 ) . I nt h i s
particular equilibrium, for every s all type b borrow and for every s most type g choose
 0 = x, some choose  0 =0 , and some with very low earnings choose  0 = −x. Then, in
accordance with the discussion following Proposition 4, we know that Pr(g|−x,0,0,s) <s .
Choosing any other action ( 0 ∈ {0,x}) reveals the person to be of type g and raises his
pre-type shock score to 1.
Finally, consider the case where the individual has assets (  = x). In this particular
equilibrium, for every s all type b borrow and for every s most type g choose  0 = x and
some choose  0 =0 . If the individual chooses  0 ∈ {0,x}, then his ϕ will rise to 1 since type
b people never choose  0 ∈ {0,x}.
Next we plot the equilibrium q function in Figure 4. Since q∗(−x,σ)=( 1+r)−1 × [1 −
η(Dg(−x,σ; q∗)] · σ and η(Dg(−x,σ; q∗)) is independent of σ in this equilibrium, the price
rises linearly throughout [0.5,0.9]. It’s worth emphasizing that the loan price depends on the
person’s updated score, and therefore depends on his   and s, a point that is not evident in
Figure 4. This is true because the price paid for a loan is given by q∗(−x,Ψ∗(−x,0, ,s)).
This is graphed in Figure 5 and for completeness we plot Ψ∗(−x,0, ,s)i nF i g u r e6 . T h i s
feature of the environment can have surprising implications. For instance, the price oﬀered
on a loan is strictly decreasing in the person’s initial asset position. As discussed earlier,
type g people with   = x never borrow regardless of s and so the price of a loan oﬀered
to someone with assets is lowest because only type b borrow. But some type g people with
  = 0 borrow regardless of s so the price of a loan oﬀered to people without assets is higher.
Finally, the price on a loan oﬀered to someone with debt is higher than the other two because
in this oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path case Ψ∗(−x,0,−x,s)=( 1− δa)s + δb(1 − s). Basically, the
market views running down one’s assets as a signal that a person is more likely to be of type
b — hence the interest rate oﬀered to people who take such actions is correspondingly high.
I tm a yb ep o s s i b l et oﬁnd regions where the price could decline. This could happen if
Dg(−x,σ; q∗) is not independent of σ and Dg(−x,σ1; q∗) ⊂ Dg(−x,σ2; q∗)f o rσ1 <σ 2.
20The reason for this is that a type g person’s opportunity cost of default is inversely related
to his score. To understand this point, it is important to remember that the only reason
anyone cares about his score is the eﬀect the score has on the terms of credit. We can
determine part of his opportunity cost by noting what happens to his score if he defaults
versus if he repays. To see this, consider Figure 7, which plots the diﬀerence in the loan
p r i c eh ef a c e st o m o r r o wi fh ec h o o s e s 0 = x today relative to the price he faces if he defaults
today: q(−x,Ψ∗(x,0,−x,s))−q(−x,Ψ∗(0,1,−x,s)). As is evident, the diﬀerence is generally
declining in s.
P u ts o m e w h a td i ﬀerently, a person’s beneﬁt from investing in reputation is high when
the person’s current reputation is low. As the person’s reputation improves, the value of
enhancing it further declines and the person repays less frequently. Returning to Figure 3,
the enhancement to one’s reputation from not defaulting is given by the diﬀerence between
one’s posterior if he doesn’t default, which in this equilibrium is Ψ∗(x,0,−x,s)=1−δg, and
one’s posterior if he does default Ψ∗(0,1,−x,s).
Finally, in Figure 8 we plot the invariant distribution of agents across type scores and
asset holdings. As can be seen, a little under 12% of the population are borrowers and have
low to medium type scores. Most people with high scores either hold positive assets (66%)
or no assets (14%). Finally, there are some agents with no assets but medium type scores (a
little over 8%).
At this point it is useful to summarize the extent to which a type score has properties
similar to a credit score in the equilibrium studied so far. A type score is like a credit score
in the following regard:
• The relationship between a type score and loan price is positive.
• Default reduces type-score.
• For people without assets, taking on debt reduces type-score.
In closing, one ﬁnal comment is order. So far we have studied cases where one type is
entirely myopic. This is, of course, a rather stringent assumption but we may view it as an
approximation to the case where type b people aren’t totally myopic but are greatly more
21impatient than type g.S p e c i ﬁcally, we have veriﬁed that we can get an equilibrium with βb
positive but small (βb =0 .10) in which type b people continue to behave as they did under
complete myopia — they default if they have debt and borrow otherwise.
5 Legal Restrictions on the Length of Credit History
As mentioned in the introduction, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires credit bureaus to
exclude a bankruptcy ﬁling from credit reports after 10 years (and all other adverse items
after 7 years). In terms of our model, this is a restriction on T. In this section, we consider
the implications of setting T = 1 in our environment for equilibrium behavior and welfare.
When T =1 , there are 4 possible ( t,h t(1)) = ( t,d t−1) histories at any date t. This set
is smaller than #({0,1})#(L) =2 3 since default decisions imply certain asset choices (i.e.
dt−1 =1i m p l i e s t =0 ) .
W h i l ea l lt h er e s u l t sa b o u tb e h a v i o ro fi = b types holds in this environment, it is still the
case that it is hard to prove things about the behavior of type g people since their decisions
are once again aﬀected by (q∗,Ψ∗) which itself is determined by their actions. Thus, we again
turn to exploring the behavior of type g people numerically. We use the identical parameter
values as the previous section.
The surprising result is that even with this high degree of restriction of credit recording,
agents behave as if in the T = ∞ case. This is somewhat less surprising when one realizes
that there is a large degree of discreteness in the action space. All equilibrium objects are
in fact identical (prices, the invariant distribution). Speciﬁcally, the equilibrium posteriors
are given by:
Equilibrium Ψ Function Ψ∗( 0,d, ,h(1))
•   = −x,d−1 =0= ⇒ Pr(g| − x,0) = 0.51
1. Ψ∗(0,1,−x,0) = 0.62 > Pr(g| − x,0)
2. Ψ∗(−x,0,−x,0) = (1 − δg)Pr(g| − x,0) + δb(1 − Pr(g| − x,0))
3. Ψ∗(0,0,−x,0) = (1 − δg)Pr(g| − x,0) + δb(1 − Pr(g| − x,0))
224. Ψ∗(x,0,−x,0) = 1 − δg
•   =0 ,d −1 =1= ⇒ Pr(g|0,1) = 0.62.
1. Ψ∗(−x,0,0,1) = 0.51
2. Ψ∗(0,0,0,1) = 1 − δg
3. Ψ∗(x,0,0,1) = 1 − δg
•   =0 ,d −1 =0= ⇒ Pr(g|0,0) = 1 − δg.
1. Ψ∗(−x,0,0,0) = 0.55
2. Ψ∗(0,0,0,0) = 1 − δg
3. Ψ∗(x,0,0,0) = 1 − δg
•   = x, d−1 =0= ⇒ Pr(g|x,0) = 1 − δg.
1. Ψ∗(−x,0,x,0) = δb
2. Ψ∗(0,0,x,0) = 1 − δg
3. Ψ∗(x,0,x,0) = 1 − δg
Using these ﬁgures, we can compute the changes in average score following a removal of
the bankruptcy ﬂag from one’s record to compare it to Figure 1 in Musto. The credit score
with default is given by Pr(g|0,1) = 0.62. T h ea v e r a g es c o r ea f t e rt h ed e f a u l tl e a v e st h ec r e d i t
record (next period for T =1 )i sg i v e nb y
P
i,( 0,0)⊃(0,1) η(Ei( 0,0,0,1))Ψ∗( 0,0,0,1) = 0.75.
In this case, the jump in score is 21%. Musto found that for individuals in the highest pre-
default quintile of credit scores, they jumped ahead of 19% of households after the score left
their record. This provides an (admittedly highly stylistic) example where ex-ante welfare
is identical for the T =1a n dT = ∞ equilibria despite large movements in credit scores
associated with the legally imposed removal of adverse events from individual credit histories.
236C o n c l u s i o n
It is well known that lenders use credit scores to regulate the extension of consumer credit.
People with high scores are oﬀered credit on more favorable terms. People who default
on their loans experience a decline in their scores and, therefore, lose access to credit on
favorable terms. People who run up debt also experience a decline in their credit scores and
have to pay higher interest rates on new loans. While credit scores play an important role in
the allocation of consumer credit they have not been adequately studied in the consumption
smoothing literature. This paper attempts to remedy this gap.
We described an economic environment in which a credit score — i.e., a person’s index
of creditworthiness — could be given a precise meaning. Speciﬁcally, the two types of people
in our environment diﬀered with respect to their rates of time preference. Lenders could
not directly observe a person’s type but made probabilistic assessments of it based on the
person’s ﬁnancial history. We referred to the probability that a person is of a given type as
ap e r s o n ’ stype score. We showed, via an example, that if one of the types discounted the
future heavily then the probability that a person is of the patient type (i.e., the type that
does not discount the future heavily) behaves like a credit score.T h a t i s ( i ) t h e t e r m s o f
credit depend favorably on the probability of a person being of the patient type, (ii) this
probability declines if a person defaults on a loan and (iii) this probability declines also when
a person takes on new debt.The paper also provided an (admittedly highly stylistic) example
where ex-ante welfare is identical for equilibria where records face legal restrictions on the
time that adverse events can remain on individual credit histories vis-a-vis the unrestricted
case, despite what might seem like ineﬃciently large movements in credit scores after the
ﬂag is removed.
Many questions remain. First, how robust is our theory of credit scores to a richer asset
space or endowment process? Richness of the asset space has important implications for
signalling. Second, will type scores behave like credit scores for other type diﬀerences -
such as attitude to risk or occupational risk - between people? Third, do high credit scores
encourage the “good risks” (the patient types in this model) to default more frequently in the
data? Because maintaining a good reputation is costly, our theory implied that the “good
24risks” have a greater incentive to default when their scores are high. This implication seems
integral to the reputation-based theory of credit scores developed in this paper. Finally,
when do credit scores fail to be a “suﬃcient statistic” in the updating function?
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Figure 4: Equilibrium q Function
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Figure 5: Equilibrium q for Different Initial Assets 
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Figure 6: Posterior for Borrowers for Different Initial Assets
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Figure 7: Partial Value of a Reputation 
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Figure 8: Fraction of Agents Across type Scores at the Stationary Distribution
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